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Abstract: (a) Topics and Objectives. Research Group D-II-1 investigates the metaphysics of space – in 
contrast to D-II-2, which focuses on the role of space in physical theory. The group’s work gives special 
emphasis to knowledge of space and its relationship to knowledge of the physical world generally. A central 
concern has been the relationship between space and bodies. One question concerns the way in which 
bodies (on some views) exclude one another from the regions of space they occupy. Is this phenomenon 
grounded in the physical, causally relevant properties of physical bodies, or rather in the metaphysical rela-
tionship between bodies and their locations or spatial extension? Plato’s Timaeus, with its pioneering and 
immensely infl uential theory of geometric elementary bodies, provides a particularly interesting test case 
for this question. An additional objective is to clarify Aristotle’s understanding of the metaphysics of bodies. 
There are numerous passages in Aristotle which contain remarks on the topic, but there are also numerous 
puzzles and diffi culties about how to interpret  those passages in a satisfying and coherent way. Moreover, 
a clearer understanding the metaphysics of bodies will enable a new understanding of various topics within 
Aristotle’s metaphysics. Especially important is the way the unity of sensible substances is related to their 
topological connectedness. Our third goal is to clarify the relationship between ancient geometrical and 
physical conceptions of body and of bodily limits by focusing on Sextus Empiricus’ parallel treatments in 
Against the Physicists and Against the Geometers. Alongside these topics concerning space and body, the 
group is researching the relationship in Aristotle between change, potentiality, and place. Our goal is to 
clarify the relationship between the ontological status of places and the ontological status of change. This 
involves a reconsideration of Aristotle’s defi nition of change and his classifi cation of changes.
(b) Methods. The group applies interdisciplinary methods – in particular ones drawn from philosophy, 
classical philology, and the history of science – to a variety of texts. The group engages in the reconstruc-
tion and critical interpretation of rational philosophical arguments. But such reconstructions are not the 
exclusive province of philosophers, and require expertise from classics about language, texts, and contexts, 
as well as expertise from the history of science about contemporary science, the development of particular 
scientifi c concepts, and the historiography of scientifi c concepts (e.g., how to think about the continuity and 
discontinuity of the concept of »space« across radically different cultural and intellectual contexts).
(c) Status of Discussion. The group’s work has led to a highly productive focus, in several projects, on the 
relationship between space and body. This development has resulted from and led to further exchanges 
within the group, and connects much of the group’s work with a wider trend in ancient philosophy which 
deals with ancient concepts of body.
Projects:
•  »Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Bodies« (Christian Pfeiffer; ; dissertation project)
•  »Change and Potentiality in Aristotle’s Natural Science and Metaphysics« (Andreas Anagnostopoulos)
•  »Space, Body, and Extension« (Gábor Betegh)
•  »Body as Substance versus Body as Quantity« (Gábor Betegh, Christian Pfeiffer,
Francesca Pedriali [D-III-E-II-2 Mapping Body and Soul])
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This group’s main achievement has been to bring into focus a cluster of issues concern-
ing the relationship of space and body. This relationship is intimately connected with 
the status of knowledge of space and its relationship to knowledge of body. These issues 
surface in a variety of diverse but related philosophical contexts from the pre-Socratics, 
through Plato and Aristotle, to the Hellenistic schools and the commentary literature of 
Late Antiquity.
Bodies are three-dimensionally extended. But is being three-dimensionally extended suf-
fi cient for being a body? Or are other properties – such as impenetrability – also necessary?
Can there be three-dimensionally extended entities that are neither bodies nor properties 
of bodies? Can two bodies be in the same place at the same time or overlap? If not, what 
is it about bodies that precludes this? In virtue of what are bodies causally effi cacious? 
Merely in virtue of being three-dimensionally extended? Or in virtue of further properties?
These issues arise, for instance, in Plato’s Timaeus, where Plato describes the divine 
craftsman as fashioning particles of earth, air, fi re, and water. These particles are geomet-
ric solids (regular cubes, icosahedra, tetrahedra, and octahedra, respectively). It becomes 
clear that, when these bodies converge  they collide (rather than passing through one 
another). But the scientifi c narrative contained in the text does not tell us why this should 
be so. Are these bodies impenetrable? And if so, then why?
Gábor Betegh has worked out an answer to this question on Plato’s behalf, one that 
does not rely on notions of impenetrability. This makes his answer both philosophically 
interesting (since one would have expected impenetrability to play a role) and textually 
justifi able (since the text says nothing about impenetrability). Betegh’s answer involves 
two parts. The fi rst concerns any two bodies of different kinds, for instance a particle of 
fi re one of water. Any two bodies of different kinds will necessarily have opposite proper-
ties that supervene on their geometrical properties (for instance hot and cold), and op-
posite properties cannot be present at the same time at the same place. Thus such bodies, 
with different geometrical and hence physical properties, cannot interpenetrate due to the 
mutual exclusion of opposites. This account does not, however, apply to two bodies of the 
same kind (two particles of fi re do not have opposite physical properties), and a second 
answer must be sought to cover such cases. The proposed, and more tentative, answer 
relies on the stricture, explicit in the text, that these crafted bodies be as beautiful as 
possible – where »beautiful« means »geometrically regular.« If two particles of the same 
kind were to interpenetrate, a terribly misshapen body would result – or at least a body 
that is not beautiful.
The Timaeus, then, accounts for the fact that bodies collide and do not interpenetrate in 
a completely different way than we might have expected. This fact derives from general 
metaphysical facts about opposites and from teleological facts about beauty.
Our working group has arrived at three results regarding Aristotelian themes related to 
body and to space. The fi rst concerns the reasons why Aristotle espouses the doctrine 
that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. Aristotle clearly asserts this 
doctrine in a number of places in his works. (It is denied just as clearly by the Stoics.) But 
he does not explain its basis. Christian Pfeiffer has worked out a very interesting idea, 
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4which, like Betegh’s reading of the Timaeus, explains this principle about bodies in much 
more »metaphysical« terms than one might have expected. In particular, Pfeiffer thinks 
that Aristotle specifi es necessary and suffi cient conditions for the individuation of bodies 
in terms of their boundaries. Two bodies cannot be in the same place because this would 
entail that they have the same boundaries at the same time, which is for Aristotle impos-
sible. Pfeiffer explains in detail how this view is entailed by texts about bodies and their 
boundaries and works out thoroughly the philosophical picture that emerges.
He has also recognized a problem that is created by Aristotle’s views about body, sub-
stance, and continuity. In particular, Aristotle believes that perceptible substances are 
living organisms which necessarily have complex (non-homogenous) bodies. But Aristotle 
also thinks that substances are continuous and that no two bodies can be continuous with 
one another. Two bodies might touch at their extremities, but continuity is something 
else. In particular, continuity comes about when the extremities of »two« bodies become 
one. In such cases, it follows that there is only a single body. It is not clear how this view 
about continuity is compatible with the complex (non-homogenous) character of sub-
stances. For this would seem to entail that substances have internal boundaries between 
the various non-homogenous parts – for instance, a boundary between a bone and some 
surrounding tissue, or between blood and fl esh. But Aristotle seems to think that such 
boundaries would entail that there are not one but two bodies. The discovery and devel-
opment of this problem itself qualifi es as a »result« in the sense that it is an intellectually 
valuable outcome of our research.
Moreover, Pfeiffer proposes a solution, one that he is now working out in detail. The nub 
of the solution is that Aristotle requires us to rethink our pre-theoretical intuitions about 
the locations of the boundaries of bodies. While we might have thought that the question 
of where there are boundaries is »merely« mathematical or physical, it turns out to be 
an essentially metaphysical question for Aristotle, one whose answer depends on which 
bodies we take to be substances. This set of issues places Pfeiffer in a position to make 
a major contribution to Aristotle scholarship, partly by illuminating the largely ignored 
concept of body in Aristotle, and partly by providing a new approach to well-worn issues 
about substance and unity.
Our group has also addressed another problem which has been largely ignored until now, 
which related to the metaphysical status of bodies in Aristotle. The problem concerns the 
classifi cation of bodies vis à vis the categories. Aristotle recognizes distinct categories of 
beings, including substances and quantities. Categories are mutually exclusive: whatever 
belongs to one category cannot belong to another. This is especially important for the 
category of substance, since the substances are the entities that all other entities depend 
on. Any quantity depends on a substance, whereas a substance is that on which quanti-
ties (etc.) depend. For this reason, it is perplexing that Aristotle clearly and emphatically 
categorizes bodies both as substances and as quantities. Gábor Betegh and Christian 
Pfeiffer, together with Francesca Pedriali (a member of D-III-E-II-2 Mapping Body and 
Soul), have written a paper explaining this problem and proposing a solution. The solu-
tion requires distinguishing two senses of body. In one sense, body is defi ned as three-
dimensionally extended fi gure (where being a fi gure requires having defi nite boundaries 
and hence a determinate shape and size). Bodies in this sense belong to the category of 
quantity, that is, they are not substances but rather quantitative aspects of substances. In 
the other sense, body is instead defi ned as the bearer of certain (active and passive) causal 
Research Group D-II-1 | The Ontology of Space
Friederike Fless – Gerd Graßhoff – Michael Meyer (eds.) | Reports of the Research Groups at the Topoi 
Plenary Session 2010 | © 2011 eTopoi. Journal for Ancient Studies (ISSN 2192-2608) http://journal.topoi.org
5powers, such as a living animal. These bodies are substances, not quantities. Bodies in 
the second sense necessarily have bodies in the fi rst sense, but they are not identical with 
them, and thus the two kinds of bodies can belong in distinct categories.
The group is also working on the ontology of space in Aristotle through the lens of change 
and potentiality. This provides a complementary approach to our work on space and 
body. It is also intimately connected with Groups D-II-2 (Place, Space, and Motion) and 
D-III-E-II-2 (Mapping Body and Soul), and there have been extensive exchanges among 
the members of these groups. For instance, there was an intensive reading group on
De Anima involving several members of both groups during winter semester 2009/10. (In 
the future, some reorganization will help to clarify thematic affi nities among projects.)
Anagnostopoulos has been attempting to clarify what change, including in particular 
locomotion, amounts to for Aristotle. Both the metaphysical status of change and the 
metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle’s conception of change remain hotly contested 
issues. Anagnostopoulos argues that several of Aristotle’s most fundamental discussions 
of change in his Physics are motivated not by convictions about the ontology of change, 
but by the need for change to be subject to explanation. This is of absolute importance, 
since for Aristotle, changing things are the primary object of natural science. Anag-
nostopoulos’s bold view is that Aristotle’s conception of change does not commit him to 
the problematic claim that change is an »actuality« (entelecheia). This is a term Aristotle 
employs, and probably invented, to capture the ontological status of entities that are most 
real and most complete instantiations of a kind. Change, for Aristotle, is understood as a 
sub-species of the more general category of process or activity. This raises several diffi cult 
questions about how to distinguish genuine changes from other activities. Aristotle is well 
aware of the importance of spelling out the boundaries of the concept of change. For this 
will (partly) determine the scope of his natural science, which is the study of the world 
insofar as it is subject to change.
One of the most interesting such cases concerns the boundary between natural science 
and psychology. Aristotle famously characterizes perception as »an alteration of a sort.« 
Although he employs the basic framework of natural science in his account of perception 
in De Anima, Aristotle is careful to point out that this framework does not apply in any 
straightforward way to the case of perception. Anagnostopoulos argues that the crucial 
factor that distinguishes perception from genuine change can be traced back to Aristotle’s 
defi nition of change in Physics III, as »the activity of a potential being, as such.« According
to Anagnostopoulos, Aristotle has in mind a restricted notion of potentiality that applies 
to the subjects of change, but not to perceivers, as such. Anagnostopoulos’s collaboration 
with the group, »Mapping Body and Soul« (D-III-E-II-2) has been especially fruitful in 
supporting his research on the relations between Aristotle’s natural science and psychology.
Perhaps the most important metaphysical presupposition of change stems from the idea 
that change, for Aristotle, is an expression of an object’s potentiality. Anagnostopoulos 
has submitted for review a paper that is devoted to identifying and distinguishing the 
senses of dunamis (power, potentiality) employed by Aristotle. The dependence of change 
on potentiality also raises special diffi culties for the ontology of place. Aristotle’s account 
of change, of which locomotion is a species, commits him to the idea that locomotion is 
the activity of an object that is potentially somewhere, in other words, of an object with 
a »potential place.« This, however, appears to confl ict with Aristotle’s explicit account of 
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6place and void in book IV of his Physics. The notion of place required by Aristotle’s account
of locomotion seems to be a notion of place as something capable of being fi lled by differ-
ent bodies, logically separable from any particular body. On the other hand, Physics IV 
puts forward as fundamental the notion of the place of a particular thing and rejects as 
tantamount to a version of the void the idea of place that is logically independent of body, 
but includes some obscure remarks to the effect that void might exist »as potential.«
Anagnostopoulos is also working on the relation between space, change, and time, with 
the aim of understanding their common topological properties, for example, the fact that 
all three are continuous but only fi nitely divisible in actuality. Aristotle’s systematic com-
mitments appear to give priority to space over spatial change, and priority to change over 
time, insofar as Aristotle defi nes time as a »number of change.« This suggests that the 
topological features of time are to be understood as following from the topological features
of space, via the notion of change. 
Body returns to center stage in Betegh’s work on Sextus Empiricus. In Against the
Physicists, Sextus argues against the coherence of the very concept of body. He rightly 
contends that most of the dogmatic philosophers of nature are corporealists, i.e. take 
body as their ultimate principle. But if they cannot provide us with a coherent conception 
of body – and Sextus aims to show that they cannot – their whole dogmatic theoretical 
edifi ce crumbles. Oddly, however, Sextus’s arguments are drawn, often word for word, 
from another work, Against the Mathematicians. This is curious and problematic because 
most of the targeted dogmatic schools, most notably the Epicureans and the Stoics, did 
not accept that physical bodies could be described as derivable from mathematical bodies, 
and thus that the mathematical conception of body, and the notions of geometrical limit 
entities, would be applicable to physical bodies and their boundaries.
Betegh draws two related conclusions. First, he suggests that Sextus may in fact have 
borrowed from earlier physicists’ arguments against the geometrical concept of body. 
But while the physicists used these arguments either to show the internal incoherence 
of geometry or to show its irrelevance to a description of physical bodies, Sextus turns 
these arguments against the physicists themselves. Is this reasonable and justifi ed, or is 
it sophistry? This brings us to Betegh’s second conclusion. Sextus seems to work on the 
reasonable (although certainly defeasible) assumption that the coherence of any physical 
concept of body presupposes the coherence of the geometrical concept of body. After all, 
all the relevant parties agree that both physical bodies and geometrical bodies are three-
dimensionally extended fi gures. It is thus reasonable to think that if the concept of a 
three-dimensionally extended fi gure is incoherent, then a fortiori the concept of physical 
body, like the concept of geometrical body, is incoherent.
In the earlier phases of the project, Christof Rapp also organized a conference on »The 
Place of Ideas« (focusing on Aristotle’s criticisms of the Platonic theory of forms in Meta-
physics A 9), and a workshop on Epicurus’s Letter to Herodotus. These were very produc-
tive events at which group members came together with leading scholars from abroad. 
Since Rapp has departed, they no longer represent ongoing projects within the group.
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Workshop: »Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus«. Contributions by Attila Nemeth,
Gábor Betegh, Karel Thein, Máté Eros, Christian Pfeiffer, Francesca Masi, Jakub Jirsa,
Péter Lautner, Ana Gavran Milos, Filip Grgic, Luka Borsic. Berlin, May 16–17, 2008.
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Dorothea Frede, Michel Crubellier, Christof Rapp, Jacob Rosen, Tim Clarke, Gail Fine, 
Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Tim Wagner. Berlin, January 9–10, 2009.
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95 Further Grants
In their capacities as Codirectors of the Graduate School for Ancient Philosophy, Jonathan
Beere and Christoph Helmig, have received a three-year, € 300.000 grant from the DAAD 
to support a binational network for doctoral study. The grant will fi nance collaboration 
with Princeton, Toronto, Chicago, and Leuven intended to foster cooperative advising of 
graduate students in ancient philosophy at these institutions.
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